With a career built at companies like Visa, Ellie May, and Blackhawk, Selim Aissi, a 2026 CSO hall of fame inductee, understands how boards and executives demand a clear justification for cyber security investment, especially considering today’s difficult economic climate.But getting security leaders to communicate tec…
With a career built at companies like Visa, Ellie May, and Blackhawk, Selim Aissi, a 2026 CSO hall of fame inductee, understands how boards and executives demand a clear justification for cyber security investment, especially considering today’s difficult economic climate.But getting security leaders to communicate tec…
A lot of organizations add tools, and more platforms and controls in response to new threats. Yet that doesn’t necessarily address underlying complexities. Security investment can actually increase operational and strategic risk.
“I think there’s a tipping point once a reasonable depth of defense is in place,” he says. “When there’s a reasonable level of automation of security controls and cross integration of security tools, anything beyond that could potentially be overspend and could potentially add risk to the entire organization.”
So the challenge is to know when an environment exists and functions without the need for a sudden budget spike.
“All of the KRIs and KPIs in place should be able to indicate the level of resiliency,” he adds, “in addition to other controls such as making sure there are processes that would allow for detection of, let’s say, API abuse, cloud-level abuse, and, increasingly these days, AI as it adds yet another threat vector.”
Understanding risk also lies in recognizing the distinction between organizations that are genuinely resilient, and those that appear mature on paper, focused on fine-tuning policies, compliance, governance, and frameworks.
In context
- Topic: Ciberseguridad — Riesgo, identidad, respuesta a incidentes y cumplimiento.
- Source: CIO
- Published: 14/10/2026
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Why it matters
In security the story is rarely the attack. It is the time between the intrusion and somebody noticing. That number says more about an organisation than any certificate hanging on the reception wall.
My way of reading these cases is to ask what failed in the process, not what failed in the machine. Behind nearly every incident there is a reasonable decision taken under pressure: granting a permission to unblock somebody, postponing an update because it was month-end. That is where the lesson lives.
What usually goes wrong
The most expensive blind spot is usually the supplier. The organisation hardens its own perimeter and grants broad access to a third party that has half those controls. A good share of the incidents I have seen in this region came in that way, and the contract said nothing about it.
What to watch
- Whether initial access came from a legitimate account handled badly, which is the most frequent pattern.
- What could be restored and how fast — a backup that was never tested does not count.
- How it was communicated to customers and regulators, which is where reputational cost is decided.
How I read this entry
What I would review this very week is access: accounts belonging to people who left, permissions that grew without anyone trimming them, and shared credentials everybody swears do not exist. It is the least glamorous work and the one that cuts off the most attacks.
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Living through this in your own team?
Open the chat and tell me how you're handling it. I'm interested in comparing notes.
