O MITRE publicou em 13 de outubro de 2026 a versão 20 do ATT&CK, que adiciona nove técnicas do domínio Enterprise para descrever como atacantes podem mirar sistemas de IA, roubar senhas de aplicativo para contornar a autenticação multifator (MFA) e burlar verificações de CAPTCHA.
O MITRE publicou em 13 de outubro de 2026 a versão 20 do ATT&CK, que adiciona nove técnicas do domínio Enterprise para descrever como atacantes podem mirar sistemas de IA, roubar senhas de aplicativo para contornar a autenticação multifator (MFA) e burlar verificações de CAPTCHA.
Em contexto
- Tema: Ciberseguridad — Riesgo, identidad, respuesta a incidentes y cumplimiento.
- Fonte: CISO Advisor
- Publicado: 16/10/2026
Continuar lendo na fonte original →
Trecho publicado automaticamente pelo radar do site. O texto completo pertence ao veículo e está vinculado acima.
Why it matters
Every time I read a case like this I think the same thing: security is not bought, it is operated. You can own every tool on the market and remain exposed if nobody reviews the alerts, if patches get applied when there is time, or if the backup was never tested by actually restoring it.
My way of reading these cases is to ask what failed in the process, not what failed in the machine. Behind nearly every incident there is a reasonable decision taken under pressure: granting a permission to unblock somebody, postponing an update because it was month-end. That is where the lesson lives.
What usually goes wrong
Where it usually breaks is response, not prevention. There are tools, there are alerts, and when something real happens nobody knows who decides to disconnect, who gets called first, or what the customer is told. Valuable hours get lost arguing about that while the problem grows.
What to watch
- What could be restored and how fast — a backup that was never tested does not count.
- How it was communicated to customers and regulators, which is where reputational cost is decided.
- Whether third parties or suppliers were in the chain, because the perimeter now includes partners.
How I read this entry
If this happened near an organisation I advise, the conversation I would force is not about tools. It is about the rehearsal. How many times the incident was simulated, who calls whom, what gets said to customers and when. A plan never rehearsed is not a plan, it is a document.
The original story is published in another language; the excerpt is quoted as the publisher delivers it and the commentary is written in English.
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Living through this in your own team?
Open the chat and tell me how you're handling it. I'm interested in comparing notes.
